In the past, Europeans assumed that as China became wealthier and more developed it would inevitably become more like [them]. This led to a lack of curiosity about China’s internal debates and an attempt to primitively divide its thinkers and officials into ‘reformers’ who embrace Western ideas and ‘conservatives’ who want to return to China’s Maoist past... The stereotype outside China is that Chinese politics has remained trapped in aspic even as the economy has been through radical changes. In fact, the country has gone from having a system animated by larger-than-life charismatic figures such as Deng or Mao towards the collective bureaucratic leadership of technocrats who exercise power according to strict term limits and are subject to regular reviews by their peers and constituents... [A]lthough China’s footprint will become ever more important for the world, the drivers of its internal debates will be increasingly domestic.
In the economic realm, the main divide is between a social Darwinist New Right that wants to unlock entrepreneurial energy by privatising all the state-owned companies and an egalitarian New Left that believes the next wave of growth will be stimulated by clever state planning. In the political realm, the main divide is between political liberals who want to place limits on the power of the state, either through elections, the rule of law, or public participation, and neo-authoritarians who fear these measures will lead to a bureaucratised collective government that is unable to take tough decisions or challenge the vested interests of the corrupt, crony capitalist class. In the foreign-policy realm, the main divide is between defensive internationalists who want to play a role in the existing institutions of global governance or emphasise prudence and nationalists who want China to assert itself on the global stage.
Mark Leonard (2013) Introduction to China 3.0
***CHINA 3.0
See also:
Mark Leonard (2008) China's new intelligentsia (Vietnamese translation by Pham Toan)
Trần Hữu Dũng (2009) Ổn định và phát triển: Trí thức Trung Quốc đang nghĩ gì?
Showing posts with label civil society. Show all posts
Showing posts with label civil society. Show all posts
James G. McGann (2012) Think tanks in China
[T]he changing landscape of China’s economy redefined the context in which think tanks function in China. This shift manifested itself in the National Co-operative Law. Implemented in 2007, the National Co-operative Law represented a mild liberalization for rural civil society. New co-operatives developed in evolutionary and peaceful ways, had great respect for private property, and were self-motivated and voluntary in nature (bottom-up process). This process contributed to the expansion of democratic concepts by giving citizens effective means to shape their future lives and their world. In this sense, the new co-operative movement helped to build and change civil society in China, making civil society institutions more of a critical dialogue partner with the state. As China’s market became increasingly free, think tanks too seized the opportunity to find private financial sources. They began to use media and overseas sources as outlets for civil society. Their scholars, looking to profit from their access to the media, began representing their own views in the media rather than those of the institution. Lastly, the newly acquired money and independence from government leaders allowed them to become financially autonomous and intellectually free. Today, Chinese think tanks fill a gap caused by the Cultural Revolution and other isolationist policies of the past.
The policy arena in China is becoming progressively open and there are an increasing number of actors involved in public policy decisions. This change has not only affected the domestic activities of Chinese think tanks, but has also had a profound impact on the influence of Chinese think tanks on the world stage. A Brookings fellow noted in a recent speech that more 13 and more representatives from Chinese think tanks are coming to the United States every week to meet with U.S. institutions to exchange policy ideas.
The majority of Chinese think tanks are sponsored or directly affiliated with government agencies, such as the Development Research Center of the State Council and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations... The Chinese government sees the need to increasingly heed public opinion in its decision-making and uses input from think tanks as a way of maintaining legitimacy through a more collective leadership strategy... The political stance of the leadership in China naturally affects the dialogue and freedom of Chinese think tanks, especially with regard to domestic social issues... despite the opportunity to pursue more liberalized research, the major focus of research institutions in China today is economics and international security concerns, two transnational factors that are extremely important to China’s future and political leadership.
James G. McGann (2012) Chinese Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Global Governance
James G. McGann (2012) Chinese Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Global Governance
Tai-lok Lui (2005) Middle-class politics in contemporary China
The middle class in China’s major cities — which is often expected to be a social force to bring about democratization and an open society — is likely to be a source of disappointment to the optimists, at least in the near term. My interviews with professionals, managers, and administrators in Shanghai reveal that they are low-profile liberals, if not conservatives. True, they are well aware of rising social inequalities, regional imbalances, corruption, and other social problems. They understand that the political environment is far from satisfactory and they would like a more responsive and accountable government. Yet,they will not push for democratization; in fact, it is not even high on their list of priorities of future changes. They prefer gradual reform, meaning a slow process of the loosening of existing authoritarian governance. Their conservatism is, in a way, understandable. Their interests are firmly rooted in the existing economic structure and they are eager to preserve what they have earned in recent years. Although many of those I interviewed were uneasy about the glaring gap between the rich and the poor, and express their concern about the welfare of the needy, on the whole they feel they deserve the level and the kind of material rewards they have attained.
Attempts to quicken the pace of liberalization and democratization in China will almost certainly scare the middle class away from politics. In fact, it is often when confronted by the authoritarian state that the middle class takes a pro-liberalization stance. Thus, middle-class politics (more appropriately, a kind of nascent middle-class politics) is two-faced. On the one side, it is a soft challenge to the Chinese authoritarian state. It will be a social force to promote liberalization and during such a process of liberalization we may see the emergence of civic and pressure groups that will loosen the existing top-down authoritarian control in many aspects of social life in China. On the other side, as noted above, the middle class is more conservative when it comes to concrete state policies and the direction of future economic and political reform. Middle-class politics as such does not guarantee the fostering of the kind of democratization that will truly empower those who are suffering in the course of the capitalization of the Chinese economy, namely, workers and peasants. Nor will middle-class politics necessarily include the interests of the poor in their political platform and re-form agenda. Middle-class politics, unless re-articulated to more radical ideology brought about by dramatic changes in the structural setting at a critical conjuncture, is primarily about the interests of the middle class.
The rise of the middle class and the gradual emergence of middle-class politics in China are no substitute for agitation and resistance from below. Paradoxically, what is absent in contemporary Chinese politics is a true representation of the interests of the oppressed in the existing political structure.
Tai-lok Lui (2005) Bringing class back in, Critical Asian Studies, 37(3): 473-480
Attempts to quicken the pace of liberalization and democratization in China will almost certainly scare the middle class away from politics. In fact, it is often when confronted by the authoritarian state that the middle class takes a pro-liberalization stance. Thus, middle-class politics (more appropriately, a kind of nascent middle-class politics) is two-faced. On the one side, it is a soft challenge to the Chinese authoritarian state. It will be a social force to promote liberalization and during such a process of liberalization we may see the emergence of civic and pressure groups that will loosen the existing top-down authoritarian control in many aspects of social life in China. On the other side, as noted above, the middle class is more conservative when it comes to concrete state policies and the direction of future economic and political reform. Middle-class politics as such does not guarantee the fostering of the kind of democratization that will truly empower those who are suffering in the course of the capitalization of the Chinese economy, namely, workers and peasants. Nor will middle-class politics necessarily include the interests of the poor in their political platform and re-form agenda. Middle-class politics, unless re-articulated to more radical ideology brought about by dramatic changes in the structural setting at a critical conjuncture, is primarily about the interests of the middle class.
The rise of the middle class and the gradual emergence of middle-class politics in China are no substitute for agitation and resistance from below. Paradoxically, what is absent in contemporary Chinese politics is a true representation of the interests of the oppressed in the existing political structure.
Tai-lok Lui (2005) Bringing class back in, Critical Asian Studies, 37(3): 473-480
Patrick Sharbaugh (2015) Civic engagement through Internet memes
On the surface it all appears to be just harmless fun and therefore inoffensive to both government officials and, crucially, to other citizens. The medium of the message allows indirect social and political commentary to sneak in disguised as lulz. And it also assures that the content is shared much more widely and viewed much more widely than direct critique would be. In between the two poles of the starry-eyed techno-utopians and the skeptics there are thinkers who’ve suggested that the real potential of online tools for social change in places like Vietnam is not necessarily in coordinating massive street protests and mobilizing activist movements but rather in how they enable citizens to articulate and debate a welter of conflicting ideas throughout society. In other words, social media may matter most not in the streets and the squares but in the myriad spaces of the social commons that Jürgen Habermas called the public sphere. These images and the worldviews behind them are becoming part of the national discourse in Vietnam. And in the process they are quietly, incrementally shifting the zeitgeist.
It’s often said by way of criticism that these images are amateurish and juvenile and short-lived, and that’s true. But they seem to be achieving what all the finger-wagging from the dissident bloggers in Western democracies has not. They’re changing minds. And they’re doing it so precisely because they are juvenile and short-lived and ephemeral and yes, often silly. That’s the whole point.
Patrick Sharbaugh (2015) How meme culture is empowering civic engagement in the socialist republic of Vietnam?
It’s often said by way of criticism that these images are amateurish and juvenile and short-lived, and that’s true. But they seem to be achieving what all the finger-wagging from the dissident bloggers in Western democracies has not. They’re changing minds. And they’re doing it so precisely because they are juvenile and short-lived and ephemeral and yes, often silly. That’s the whole point.
Patrick Sharbaugh (2015) How meme culture is empowering civic engagement in the socialist republic of Vietnam?
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