Chad Raymond, Mark Selden, and Kate Zhou (2000) Rural Resistance and Reform in China and Vietnam

This article examines the social bases of agrarian transformation during and
after the communist-led collectivization of agriculture in China and Vietnam.
The social science literature generally portrays rural people as passive, depoliticized
and dependent. Nowhere is this more true than in studies of socialist
societies that have been heavily influenced by totalitarian and authoritarian
theories. The literature focuses on the initiative and power of supreme leaders,
as well as party and state mobilization, to explain social and institutional
change. This perspective, while not uncontested, holds generally for the subject
reviewed here.’

Our central thesis, in contrast, is that the cumulative weight of rural resistance
eventually made it too costly, both economically and politically, for the
respective states of China and Vietnam to continue collectivized agriculture.
While recognizing significant differences in the structure and performance of
collectivized agriculture in Vietnam and China, this study underlines strikingly
similar tactics used by farmers to circumvent, resist and eventually, under politically
fortuitous conditions, contribute to the elimination of the core institutions
of collective agriculture and expand the scope of the market and household economies.
We consider, in short, the interplay of resistance from below and the
roles of party and state in generating fundamental social change.

If everyday resistance succeeds in dividing ruling groups, it has the
capacity to contribute to and shape far-reaching social change. Yet if Vietnamese
and Chinese villagers have manifested surprising strength in generating
system change, this should not blind us to the fact that they have yet to institutionalize
their power in a manner that will guarantee their future participation in
decisive political processes.

Chad Raymond, Mark Selden, and Kate Zhou (2000) The Power of the Strong: Rural Resistance and Reform in China and Vietnam. China Information 14 (2): 1-30

Mark Leonard (2013) China's ideological divides

In the past, Europeans assumed that as China became wealthier and more developed it would inevitably become more like [them]. This led to a lack of curiosity about China’s internal debates and an attempt to primitively divide its thinkers and officials into ‘reformers’ who embrace Western ideas and ‘conservatives’ who want to return to China’s Maoist past... The stereotype outside China is that Chinese politics has remained trapped in aspic even as the economy has been through radical changes. In fact, the country has gone from having a system animated by larger-than-life charismatic figures such as Deng or Mao towards the collective bureaucratic leadership of technocrats who exercise power according to strict term limits and are subject to regular reviews by their peers and constituents... [A]lthough China’s footprint will become ever more important for the world, the drivers of its internal debates will be increasingly domestic.

In the economic realm, the main divide is between a social Darwinist New Right that wants to unlock entrepreneurial energy by privatising all the state-owned companies and an egalitarian New Left that believes the next wave of growth will be stimulated by clever state planning. In the political realm, the main divide is between political liberals who want to place limits on the power of the state, either through elections, the rule of law, or public participation, and neo-authoritarians who fear these measures will lead to a bureaucratised collective government that is unable to take tough decisions or challenge the vested interests of the corrupt, crony capitalist class. In the foreign-policy realm, the main divide is between defensive internationalists who want to play a role in the existing institutions of global governance or emphasise prudence and nationalists who want China to assert itself on the global stage.

Mark Leonard (2013) Introduction to China 3.0
***CHINA 3.0

See also:
Mark Leonard (2008) China's new intelligentsia (Vietnamese translation by Pham Toan)
Trần Hữu Dũng (2009) Ổn định và phát triển: Trí thức Trung Quốc đang nghĩ gì?

Xiang Zhou and Yu Xie (2015) Intergenerational social mobility in China

In China as well as other post-socialist countries, the emergence of markets provided abundant opportunities for the old elites to convert their political power into physical capital, thus making socioeconomic status far more inheritable than before. Meanwhile, a more market-driven reward system spurred a sharp increase in income inequality, thereby equipping upper-class families with more resources and incentives to pass their economic advantages on to their offspring. The abolition of egalitarian educational policies, moreover, severely limited the channel of upward mobility for children of socioeconomically disadvantaged families. A combination of these processes may well explain the consolidation of status hierarchy and its influence on social fluidity.

Absolute rates of mobility, especially of upward mobility, have grown substantially from the cohort born in the 1950s to that born in the 1970s. This growth, however, has been entirely driven by the force of industrialization—that is, the placement of an increasingly larger share of children of farming origin into nonfarming occupations. When the farm sector is excluded, both the rise in upward mobility and the decline in class immobility disappear... Given that industrialization and rural-urban migration have sped up in China during the same period, this finding accords with our hypothesis that... the boundary between agriculture and other sectors tends to be more permeable in rapidly industrializing countries than in advanced industrial societies.

Xiang Zhou and Yu Xie (2015) Market Transition, Industrialization, andSocial Mobility Trends in Post-Revolution China

James G. McGann (2012) Think tanks in China

[T]he changing landscape of China’s economy redefined the context in which think tanks function in China. This shift manifested itself in the National Co-operative Law. Implemented in 2007, the National Co-operative Law represented a mild liberalization for rural civil society. New co-operatives developed in evolutionary and peaceful ways, had great respect for private property, and were self-motivated and voluntary in nature (bottom-up process). This process contributed to the expansion of democratic concepts by giving citizens effective means to shape their future lives and their world. In this sense, the new co-operative movement helped to build and change civil society in China, making civil society institutions more of a critical dialogue partner with the state. As China’s market became increasingly free, think tanks too seized the opportunity to find private financial sources. They began to use media and overseas sources as outlets for civil society. Their scholars, looking to profit from their access to the media, began representing their own views in the media rather than those of the institution. Lastly, the newly acquired money and independence from government leaders allowed them to become financially autonomous and intellectually free. Today, Chinese think tanks fill a gap caused by the Cultural Revolution and other isolationist policies of the past.

The policy arena in China is becoming progressively open and there are an increasing number of actors involved in public policy decisions. This change has not only affected the domestic activities of Chinese think tanks, but has also had a profound impact on the influence of Chinese think tanks on the world stage. A Brookings fellow noted in a recent speech that more 13 and more representatives from Chinese think tanks are coming to the United States every week to meet with U.S. institutions to exchange policy ideas. 

The majority of Chinese think tanks are sponsored or directly affiliated with government agencies, such as the Development Research Center of the State Council and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations... The Chinese government sees the need to increasingly heed public opinion in its decision-making and uses input from think tanks as a way of maintaining legitimacy through a more collective leadership strategy... The political stance of the leadership in China naturally affects the dialogue and freedom of Chinese think tanks, especially with regard to domestic social issues... despite the opportunity to pursue more liberalized research, the major focus of research institutions in China today is economics and international security concerns, two transnational factors that are extremely important to China’s future and political leadership.

James G. McGann (2012) Chinese Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Global Governance 

Theda Skocpol (1982) Peasant mobilisation for the Vietnamese revolution

There is no reason why organized revolutionary movements, once on the scene, cannot appeal to many different kinds of agrarian cultivators, including "traditional" ones. This certainly was what the Vietnamese Communists succeeded in doing. In mountainous areas, they mobilized minority ethnic groups, peasants, and notables together by appealing to their fears of ethnic exploitation. In northern Vietnam, they mobilized peasants by displacing the French and by pushing aside within the communal villages the exploitative landlords and the Confucian notables. And in southern Vietnam they mobilized peasants-including..., the rice sharecroppers-by seizing and redistributing large land holdings and by organizing local associations to support peasant livelihood and defend their possession of the redistributed land… The historical record shows that peasant-based revolutions have (alternatively or simultaneously) received support both from peasants economically or politically threatened by newly penetrating capitalist forces and from agrarian cultivators involved in export-agricultural production. In Vietnam, for example, the revolution gained support from northern peasants resentful of French colonial controls, and also from southern peasants set in opposition to the great landlords who dominated the export-oriented rice economy. The Vietnamese Communists were able to sink roots in both groups, drawing from them resources to wage prolonged revolutionary war. 

The Vietnamese Revolution also grew out of the impact of colonialism upon the politics of indigenous middle-class Vietnamese, who became modern-educated, yet were denied important elite posts in the French-dominated colonial state. Nationalist and revolutionary political movements were the predictable result. Thereafter, the progress, even survival, of these movements depended upon a weakening of French power-and that came only with the interimperialist military rivalries of World War 11. The Japanese captured colonial Vietnam and in 1945 displaced the Vichy French administrators, only themselves to face defeat soon thereafter at the hands of the United States and Britain. The disruptions-and ultimate vacuum-of state power during World War I1 gave the Vietnamese Communists an ideal opportunity to claim the nationalist mantle, to assert sovereignty on the heels of the departing Japanese, and finally to mobilize Vietnamese peasants (especially in the North) to resist France's attempt to reimpose colonial control. 

Thus, the military and political reverberations of imperialist expansion contributed crucially to the emergence and success of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions. Without the breakdown of the imperial and colonial regimes, without the emergence of organized revolutionary parties, and without the openings created for them by interimperialist military rivalries, the peasants of China and Vietnam could not have been mobilized for revolution. And given the local agrarian structures of China and Vietnam, the peasants could not have become revolutionary in the absence of direct mobilization.

Theda Skocpol (1982) Review: What Makes Peasants Revolutionary? Comparative Politics 14(3): 351-375

Ivan Szelenyi (2015) The Vietnamese transition

Vietnam, much like China some seven years earlier, dismantled the agricultural cooperatives and gave agrarian production back to the peasants (this is something Russia never did and the Central European countries did not do either). So in one stroke Vietnam eliminated food shortages and as far as we can tell dramatically reduced poverty during transition (while as we saw poverty skyrocketed in the former USSR and its European satellites). Vietnam also followed China by NOT combining perestroika with glasnost, hence retaining the political monopoly of the Communist Party, what arguably was the precondition – but for a price what many would judge to be unaffordable – of a gradualist transformation (this again is something what distinguished Vietnam and China from the European post-communist regimes – see this point in Yamaoka 2007. 9.) Nevertheless, Vietnam’s reforms were not only later than the Chinese, they also had more of a shock element. While Vietnam did not rush to mass privatization, it moved more aggressively to market liberalization, shut down early state enterprises, opened faster rooms for the private sector and opened up its borders to FDI (Bunck 1996. 236.). Hence I may argue Vietnamese “capitalism from below” came with a “neo-liberal” flavour. Nevertheless, Vietnam never experienced the transitional recession/depression mainly because in the first stages of reform the rapidly expanding household sector absorbed most of the costs (and labour freed from SOEs – see McCarty 2000.) So far Vietnam is a “success story” – much like China is. They managed the transition without the frightening costs other post-communist transformation trajectories could not avoid. 

But both for China and Vietnam the BIG question is – much like for the neo-patrimonial/ rentier states, but for a different reason – sustainability. There are two major reasons why the East Asian transformation from below is vulnerable: (i) will they be able to retain their export led industrialization once the price of their labour will catch up with the rest of the world? (ii) can the political monopoly of the communist party maintained under market capitalist conditions and if it cannot is a “gradualist” transformation of the political system conceivable? If it is not and political systems either stay or fall, what would be the social and economic consequences of such a political disintegration? 

Szelenyi, I., 2015. Pathways from and Crises after Communism. Part 2.The Case of Former USSR and China. BelvedereMeridionale, 27 (1), 5-26.

Edmund Malesky and Jonathan London (2014) State-led development in Vietnam

Although we lack counterfactual evidence, it appears likely that SOEs were more often beneficiaries, rather than engines, of growth. Recent analyses of the role of the state sector in Vietnam have demonstrated [...] profound underperformance. As Pincus et al. 2012 demonstrate, SOEs in Vietnam can no longer claim to be the vanguard of the working class, at least in a numerical sense, as they account for only 11% of employment and have actually seen net employment drop by 22% between 2006 and 2010. Growth decompositions show that the state sector accounted for only 19% and 8% of GDP and industrial growth, respectively, between 2000 and 2010. Moreover, given their tremendous advantages, SOE contributions to export have been absurdly small, with most exporting accomplished by small-scale farmers and foreign investors. From textiles (Vinatex) to shipbuilding (Vinashin), Vietnamese SOEs have failed to be competitive on world markets. TFP studies by ownership in Vietnam have not been credible, because they fail to properly account for the contribution of free land and cheap capital to SOEs’ bottom line. For now, London’s (2013) characterization of Vietnam’s poorly performing industrial policy as “chaebol dreaming” remains apt.

With even modest assumptions about these cheap inputs, the state sector seems to have been a net drag on the Vietnamese economy. Three distortions have been documented: First, even though SOEs have not been successful at exporting in their core competencies, they are protected in those core competencies by Group A investment restrictions on private entry and phase-in requirements on WTO tariff-reduction obligations (Auffret 2003). Second, protections in core businesses, cheap land to rent to private producers, and cheap capital have generated tremendous cash flow that SOEs have funneled into subsidiary investment projects in unrelated businesses, as SOE managers seek to maximize their individual revenue. Vinashin, for instance, had 445 subsidiary businesses and 20 joint ventures, which ranged from real estate to hotels and karaoke. These sideline businesses crowd out more dynamic and entrepreneurial businesses (Nguyen & Freeman 2009). Third, Phan & Coxhead (2013) demonstrate adverse effects of these policies on labor markets, showing that state-sector activity has both depressed returns to skills in nonstate sectors and crowded out more skill-intensive forms of private-sector growth. The effect arises directly from the privileged role of the state sector and the lack of oversight to ensure meritocratic hiring. Because SOEs are capital intensive and protected, the returns to skills in SOEs are higher than in the private sector. Therefore, employment in SOEs is highly coveted. Nevertheless, hiring into SOEs is based on nonmarket mechanisms, such as familial connections, relationships, and outright corruption. Those without such connections have less incentive to invest in high-level skills, leading to lower-quality labor available for private-sector producers.

Critical to the debates about a new economic model is the demonstration by fine-grained scholarship that SOEs are remarkably unproductive relative to nonstate competition. Furthermore, scholars have shown that the greatest periods of growth and poverty reduction occurred when the state sector was at its weakest. In Vietnam, the 2001–2006 boom was correlated with robust growth in private investment; the post-2007 decline correlates with the return of SOEs.

Edmund Malesky and Jonathan London (2014) The political economy of development in China and Vietnam

Minh T.H. Le, Sara Holton, Huong Thanh Nguyen, Rory Wolfe, Jane Fisher (2015) Prevalence of Poly-Victimisation among Vietnamese High School Students

Although there are more than 30 million children and adolescents in Vietnam, and they account for more than a third of the nation’s population [32], there is limited evidence about poly-victimisation among them. Most previous studies in Vietnam only investigated specific forms of victimisation. The UNICEF Multi Indicator Cluster Survey 3, investigated mothers aged 15–49 years about their care of their under-five year old children and the children's health and development. Conducted in fifty low and middle income countries, it found that Vietnam was among the countries in which corporal punishment and psychological and physical abuse of children were the most prevalent [33]. Nguyen et al [18] investigated 2,581 grade 6–12 students in Vietnam and found that 67% reported at least one form and 6% all four forms of neglect, physical, emotional and sexual abuse.

This is the first study in Vietnam to investigate poly-victimisation among adolescents systematically and comprehensively.

Victimisation was widespread in this sample of high school students with nearly a third having experienced more than ten forms of victimisation.

There were much higher rates of lifetime victimisation among these Vietnamese adolescents than among secondary school students from China [29] and South Africa [31], which are upper-middle income countries. Compared to China—a country which shares many social and cultural similarities with Vietnam, the prevalence was double that reported by Chan [29]. The same conclusion can be made when the results are compared with those reported from high income countries. The prevalence of poly-victimisation in this sample (31%) is much higher than that reported among Australian 23-24-year-old young adults (14%) [3] and triple that reported by Turner et al (10%) among a national sample of American children and adolescents [22, 45]

Exposure to more adverse life events, the presence of a chronic disease or disability, living with a step-parent, perception of family as unhappy, punishment at school and rural residence increased the risk of poly-victimisation when controlling for other variables in this [study's] sample.

Minh T.H. Le, Sara Holton, Huong Thanh Nguyen, Rory Wolfe, Jane Fisher (2015) Poly-Victimisation among Vietnamese High School Students: Prevalence and Demographic Correlates, PLoS ONE 10 (5)

Tai-lok Lui (2005) Middle-class politics in contemporary China

The middle class in China’s major cities — which is often expected to be a social force to bring about democratization and an open society — is likely to be a source of disappointment to the optimists, at least in the near term. My interviews with professionals, managers, and administrators in Shanghai reveal that they are low-profile liberals, if not conservatives. True, they are well aware of rising  social  inequalities,  regional  imbalances,  corruption,  and  other  social problems. They understand that the political environment is far from satisfactory and they would like a more responsive and accountable government. Yet,they will not push for democratization; in fact, it is not even high on their list of priorities of future changes. They prefer gradual reform, meaning a slow process of the loosening of existing authoritarian governance. Their conservatism is, in a way, understandable. Their interests are firmly rooted in the existing economic structure and they are eager to preserve what they have earned in recent years. Although many of those I interviewed were uneasy about the glaring gap between the rich and the poor, and express their concern about the welfare of the needy, on the whole they feel they deserve the level and the kind of material rewards they have attained.

Attempts to quicken the pace of liberalization and democratization in China will almost certainly scare the middle class away from politics. In fact, it is often when confronted by the authoritarian state that the middle class takes a pro-liberalization stance. Thus, middle-class politics (more appropriately, a kind of nascent middle-class politics) is two-faced. On the one side, it is a soft challenge to the Chinese authoritarian state. It will be a social force to promote liberalization and during such a process of liberalization we may see the emergence of civic and pressure groups that will loosen the existing top-down authoritarian control in many aspects of social life in China. On the other side, as noted above, the middle class is more conservative when it comes to concrete state policies and the direction of future economic and political reform. Middle-class politics as such does not guarantee the fostering of the kind of democratization that will truly empower those who are suffering in the course of the capitalization of the Chinese economy, namely, workers and peasants. Nor will middle-class politics necessarily include the interests of the poor in their political platform and re-form agenda. Middle-class politics, unless re-articulated to more radical ideology brought about by dramatic changes in the structural setting at a critical conjuncture, is primarily about the interests of the middle class.

The rise of the middle class and the gradual emergence of middle-class politics in China are no substitute for agitation and resistance from below. Paradoxically, what is absent in contemporary Chinese politics is a true representation of the interests of the oppressed in the existing political structure.

Tai-lok Lui (2005) Bringing class back in, Critical Asian Studies, 37(3): 473-480

Martin Gainsborough's (2003) interpretation of big corruption cases in the 1990s

'... big corruption cases are best understood as an attempt by the political centre to discipline the lower levels of the party-state against a backdrop of increased decentralisation under reform. Such an interpretation, it is argued, makes sense both of the increased frequency with which big corruption cases have occurred in the 1990s and also the ferocity with which they have been executed. It also represents a more authentically political account insofar as the centre is no longer seen as simply clamping down on corruption "in the public interest" but rather is seen as representing one side in a struggle for influence between different levels of the state, where the prize is control over economic resources. Moreover, the successful prosecution of Tamexco and other big corruption cases, along with the centre's assertion of its authority in a number of other areas... suggests that the centre is far from a spent force. This is frequently not the dominant view in the academic literature.

The ideas put forward here also shed light on another issue, namely how we understand the "rule of law". Prosecution of big corruption cases through the courts might be read as representing a positive development as the party, once regarded as being "above the law", is now seen as willing to subject the disciplining of its own ranks to just legal process. However... more convincing is the idea that the "rule of law" is being used to pursue the interests of one particular arm of the state, namely the centre. This ties with a distinction in the China literature between "rule of law" and "rule by law". The suggestion is that China is moving in the direction of the latter than the former. Such an observation also appears appropriate in the Vietnamese case.'

Martin Gainsborough (2003) Corruption and the Politics of Economic Decentralisation in Vietnam

Jonathan London (2013) Welfare and inequalities

'Nor should the progressiveness of Vietnamese or Chinese market-Leninism be over-stated. States in both countries combine Leninist tactics of political organisation with market-based strategies of accumulation and social policies that exhibit both redistributive and neo-liberal elements. Unequal forms of citizenship imposed under state-socialism are reproduced and transformed in a manner that preserves the political supremacy of the Communist Party, while creating new market-based opportunities and inequalities. Terms such as “market socialism” or “capitalism with Chinese/Vietnamese characteristics” are inadequate as descriptors of the welfare regimes in these countries. By contrast, the term “market-Leninism” rejects the widely held but false notion that planned or market economies have any inherent political character. The market-Leninist welfare regimes in Vietnam and China demonstrate that as a class-based determinant of distributive out-comes, Leninist political organisation is ultimately much more important than socialism per se, at least for now.'

Jonathan London (2013) Welfare regimes in China and Vietnam Link