In the past, Europeans assumed that as China became wealthier and more developed it would inevitably become more like [them]. This led to a lack of curiosity about China’s internal debates and an attempt to primitively divide its thinkers and officials into ‘reformers’ who embrace Western ideas and ‘conservatives’ who want to return to China’s Maoist past... The stereotype outside China is that Chinese politics has remained trapped in aspic even as the economy has been through radical changes. In fact, the country has gone from having a system animated by larger-than-life charismatic figures such as Deng or Mao towards the collective bureaucratic leadership of technocrats who exercise power according to strict term limits and are subject to regular reviews by their peers and constituents... [A]lthough China’s footprint will become ever more important for the world, the drivers of its internal debates will be increasingly domestic.
In the economic realm, the main divide is between a social Darwinist New Right that wants to unlock entrepreneurial energy by privatising all the state-owned companies and an egalitarian New Left that believes the next wave of growth will be stimulated by clever state planning. In the political realm, the main divide is between political liberals who want to place limits on the power of the state, either through elections, the rule of law, or public participation, and neo-authoritarians who fear these measures will lead to a bureaucratised collective government that is unable to take tough decisions or challenge the vested interests of the corrupt, crony capitalist class. In the foreign-policy realm, the main divide is between defensive internationalists who want to play a role in the existing institutions of global governance or emphasise prudence and nationalists who want China to assert itself on the global stage.
Mark Leonard (2013) Introduction to China 3.0
***CHINA 3.0
See also:
Mark Leonard (2008) China's new intelligentsia (Vietnamese translation by Pham Toan)
Trần Hữu Dũng (2009) Ổn định và phát triển: Trí thức Trung Quốc đang nghĩ gì?
Showing posts with label development. Show all posts
Showing posts with label development. Show all posts
Ivan Szelenyi (2015) The Vietnamese transition
Vietnam, much like China some seven years
earlier, dismantled the agricultural cooperatives and gave agrarian production
back to the peasants (this is something Russia never did and the Central
European countries did not do either). So in one stroke Vietnam eliminated food
shortages and as far as we can tell dramatically reduced poverty during
transition (while as we saw poverty skyrocketed in the former USSR and its
European satellites). Vietnam also followed China by NOT combining perestroika
with glasnost, hence retaining the political monopoly of the Communist Party,
what arguably was the precondition – but for a price what many would judge to
be unaffordable – of a gradualist transformation (this again is something what
distinguished Vietnam and China from the European post-communist regimes – see
this point in Yamaoka 2007. 9.) Nevertheless, Vietnam’s reforms were not only
later than the Chinese, they also had more of a shock element. While Vietnam
did not rush to mass privatization, it moved more aggressively to market
liberalization, shut down early state enterprises, opened faster rooms for the
private sector and opened up its borders to FDI (Bunck 1996. 236.). Hence I may
argue Vietnamese “capitalism from below” came with a “neo-liberal” flavour.
Nevertheless, Vietnam never experienced the transitional recession/depression
mainly because in the first stages of reform the rapidly expanding household
sector absorbed most of the costs (and labour freed from SOEs – see McCarty
2000.) So far Vietnam is a “success story” – much like China is. They managed
the transition without the frightening costs other post-communist
transformation trajectories could not avoid.
But both for
China and Vietnam the BIG question is – much like for the neo-patrimonial/
rentier states, but for a different reason – sustainability. There are two
major reasons why the East Asian transformation from below is vulnerable: (i)
will they be able to retain their export led industrialization once the price
of their labour will catch up with the rest of the world? (ii) can the
political monopoly of the communist party maintained under market capitalist
conditions and if it cannot is a “gradualist” transformation of the political
system conceivable? If it is not and political systems either stay or fall,
what would be the social and economic consequences of such a political
disintegration?
Edmund Malesky and Jonathan London (2014) State-led development in Vietnam
Although we
lack counterfactual evidence, it appears likely that SOEs were more often beneficiaries, rather
than engines, of growth. Recent
analyses of the role of the state sector in Vietnam have demonstrated [...] profound underperformance.
As Pincus et al. 2012 demonstrate, SOEs in Vietnam can no longer claim to be
the vanguard of the working class, at least in a numerical sense, as they account for only 11%
of employment and have actually seen net employment drop by 22% between 2006 and 2010.
Growth decompositions show that the state sector accounted for only 19% and 8% of GDP and
industrial growth, respectively, between 2000 and 2010. Moreover, given their tremendous advantages,
SOE contributions to export have been absurdly small, with most exporting accomplished
by small-scale farmers and foreign investors. From textiles (Vinatex) to shipbuilding (Vinashin),
Vietnamese SOEs have failed to be competitive on world markets. TFP studies by ownership in
Vietnam have not been credible, because they fail to properly account for the contribution of
free land and cheap capital to SOEs’ bottom line. For now, London’s (2013) characterization of
Vietnam’s poorly performing industrial policy as “chaebol dreaming” remains apt.
With even modest assumptions about these cheap inputs, the state sector seems to have been a net drag on the Vietnamese economy. Three distortions have been documented: First, even though SOEs have not been successful at exporting in their core competencies, they are protected in those core competencies by Group A investment restrictions on private entry and phase-in requirements on WTO tariff-reduction obligations (Auffret 2003). Second, protections in core businesses, cheap land to rent to private producers, and cheap capital have generated tremendous cash flow that SOEs have funneled into subsidiary investment projects in unrelated businesses, as SOE managers seek to maximize their individual revenue. Vinashin, for instance, had 445 subsidiary businesses and 20 joint ventures, which ranged from real estate to hotels and karaoke. These sideline businesses crowd out more dynamic and entrepreneurial businesses (Nguyen & Freeman 2009). Third, Phan & Coxhead (2013) demonstrate adverse effects of these policies on labor markets, showing that state-sector activity has both depressed returns to skills in nonstate sectors and crowded out more skill-intensive forms of private-sector growth. The effect arises directly from the privileged role of the state sector and the lack of oversight to ensure meritocratic hiring. Because SOEs are capital intensive and protected, the returns to skills in SOEs are higher than in the private sector. Therefore, employment in SOEs is highly coveted. Nevertheless, hiring into SOEs is based on nonmarket mechanisms, such as familial connections, relationships, and outright corruption. Those without such connections have less incentive to invest in high-level skills, leading to lower-quality labor available for private-sector producers.
Critical to the debates about a new economic model is the demonstration by fine-grained scholarship that SOEs are remarkably unproductive relative to nonstate competition. Furthermore, scholars have shown that the greatest periods of growth and poverty reduction occurred when the state sector was at its weakest. In Vietnam, the 2001–2006 boom was correlated with robust growth in private investment; the post-2007 decline correlates with the return of SOEs.
Edmund Malesky and Jonathan London (2014) The political economy of development in China and Vietnam
With even modest assumptions about these cheap inputs, the state sector seems to have been a net drag on the Vietnamese economy. Three distortions have been documented: First, even though SOEs have not been successful at exporting in their core competencies, they are protected in those core competencies by Group A investment restrictions on private entry and phase-in requirements on WTO tariff-reduction obligations (Auffret 2003). Second, protections in core businesses, cheap land to rent to private producers, and cheap capital have generated tremendous cash flow that SOEs have funneled into subsidiary investment projects in unrelated businesses, as SOE managers seek to maximize their individual revenue. Vinashin, for instance, had 445 subsidiary businesses and 20 joint ventures, which ranged from real estate to hotels and karaoke. These sideline businesses crowd out more dynamic and entrepreneurial businesses (Nguyen & Freeman 2009). Third, Phan & Coxhead (2013) demonstrate adverse effects of these policies on labor markets, showing that state-sector activity has both depressed returns to skills in nonstate sectors and crowded out more skill-intensive forms of private-sector growth. The effect arises directly from the privileged role of the state sector and the lack of oversight to ensure meritocratic hiring. Because SOEs are capital intensive and protected, the returns to skills in SOEs are higher than in the private sector. Therefore, employment in SOEs is highly coveted. Nevertheless, hiring into SOEs is based on nonmarket mechanisms, such as familial connections, relationships, and outright corruption. Those without such connections have less incentive to invest in high-level skills, leading to lower-quality labor available for private-sector producers.
Critical to the debates about a new economic model is the demonstration by fine-grained scholarship that SOEs are remarkably unproductive relative to nonstate competition. Furthermore, scholars have shown that the greatest periods of growth and poverty reduction occurred when the state sector was at its weakest. In Vietnam, the 2001–2006 boom was correlated with robust growth in private investment; the post-2007 decline correlates with the return of SOEs.
Edmund Malesky and Jonathan London (2014) The political economy of development in China and Vietnam
World Bank (2008) Water pollution in Vietnam
Three industry groups dominate the water pollution index top
30 rankings. They relate to (a) paper and wood products, (b)
chemicals and (c) metal processing. The first group includes
corrugated paper and paperboard, particle board and
plywood, and pulp processing. Soap, detergents, cleaning
and polishing preparations, perfumes and toiletries are added
to the other more dominant chemical categories including
agro-chemical products and medical chemicals. The
processing, treatment and fabrication of iron and steel and
non-ferrous products, in addition to general mechanical
engineering, appears consistently high in all three indexes,
but especially for water and land. A broader group of food
processing industries appear in the top 30 of the water
pollution index rankings including the 48 sugar refineries and
factories in Vietnam, processing and preserving of fruit and
vegetables and “other food products” category that covers
production of coffee products, packing of tea, manufacture of
soups and broths, spices, sauces and condiments, and
frozen meat and poultry dishes. As for the other indexes, fish
processing is prominent.
The top 10 provinces stand out with high loads in the 4 types of water pollutants [TSS - total suspended solids; BOD - biological oxygen demand; metals to water; chemicals to water]covered in the index (Table 2.4). Other provinces have a more variable profile. Ninh Binh for example, which is ranked 30th on the water pollution index, is very high for TSS but relatively low for the other water pollution parameters. Analyzing that province further, two dominant industries from a pollution standpoint are VSIC-4 categories basic iron and steel and casting of iron and steel. Those two sectors are responsible for 93 percent of TSS releases in Ninh Binh Province. Binh Dinh Province, which ranks 15th on the water pollution index, ranks high for BOD but has only a moderate ranking for the other water pollution parameters. The reason for this profile is clear. Binh Dinh is a center for paper and paperboard production, a sector ranked highest nationally for BOD pollution.
Da Nang and Binh Dinh contribute most water pollutants in the Central Economic Focal Region (59 percent of BOD, 68.3 percent of TSS, 63 percent of chemicals, and 70.3 percent of metals). Da Nang alone accounts for 54.4 percent of all emissions of TSS. In terms of contribution by industrial sectors in the Central Economic Focal Region, the fertilizer and nitrogen compounds sector accounts for 26.1 percent and 21.7 percent of chemical and metal releases, respectively. The corrugated paper and paperboard sector releases 31.8 percent of BOD, and the basic iron and steel sector contributes 33.4 percent of TSS in the region. Those three sectors together have only 53 enterprises of the total in the Central Economic Focal Region.
World Bank (2008) Review and Analysis of the Pollution Impacts from Vietnamese Manufacturing Sectors
The top 10 provinces stand out with high loads in the 4 types of water pollutants [TSS - total suspended solids; BOD - biological oxygen demand; metals to water; chemicals to water]covered in the index (Table 2.4). Other provinces have a more variable profile. Ninh Binh for example, which is ranked 30th on the water pollution index, is very high for TSS but relatively low for the other water pollution parameters. Analyzing that province further, two dominant industries from a pollution standpoint are VSIC-4 categories basic iron and steel and casting of iron and steel. Those two sectors are responsible for 93 percent of TSS releases in Ninh Binh Province. Binh Dinh Province, which ranks 15th on the water pollution index, ranks high for BOD but has only a moderate ranking for the other water pollution parameters. The reason for this profile is clear. Binh Dinh is a center for paper and paperboard production, a sector ranked highest nationally for BOD pollution.
Da Nang and Binh Dinh contribute most water pollutants in the Central Economic Focal Region (59 percent of BOD, 68.3 percent of TSS, 63 percent of chemicals, and 70.3 percent of metals). Da Nang alone accounts for 54.4 percent of all emissions of TSS. In terms of contribution by industrial sectors in the Central Economic Focal Region, the fertilizer and nitrogen compounds sector accounts for 26.1 percent and 21.7 percent of chemical and metal releases, respectively. The corrugated paper and paperboard sector releases 31.8 percent of BOD, and the basic iron and steel sector contributes 33.4 percent of TSS in the region. Those three sectors together have only 53 enterprises of the total in the Central Economic Focal Region.
World Bank (2008) Review and Analysis of the Pollution Impacts from Vietnamese Manufacturing Sectors
Steve Bass et al. (2010) Viet Nam’s development priorities to date aim at high rates of economic growth – but in ways that constrain integration of environment objectives
The prevailing development narrative in Viet Nam is to achieve middle-income status through
economic growth, under conditions that (it is assumed) will also reduce poverty en route. This is in
spite of environmental damage becoming apparent and export markets increasingly demanding sustainably
produced goods. Viet Nam’s market orientation excites competition between provinces to attract foreign
direct investment (FDI), which continues to drive a ‘race to the bottom’ in ignoring environmental standards;
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to ‘steal from the future’ by polluting air and water. Heavy costs are
imposed on the environment, with much natural resource degradation and pollution, which in turn explains
much entrenched poverty. The National Environmental Performance Assessment (n.d.) is consequently
gloomy, noting how water and air quality having been static or deteriorating and big losses of biodiversity in
particular.
Environment is not central to the economic growth philosophy, except that poverty is seen to be a cause of environmental degradation. Indeed, environmental problems are sometimes attributed explicitly to some ethnic minorities – suggesting that changing the resource use practices of poor people should be the priority. Various policy documents suggest that environmental protection to make up for recent ‘environment sacrifices’ can be ‘afforded’ only once middle-income status is achieved.
The ‘economic growth first’ narrative creates great pressure to ignore environmental considerations at all levels. Production, income and economic growth are the top targets by which officials will be assessed. The associated quantitative indicators are compelling and the lack of similar quantitative environment indicators does nothing to balance the growth incentive. Furthermore, the honourable notion of ‘victory means sacrifice’ would seem to justify acceptance of the idea of sacrificing environment in the medium term – why create only one ‘green job’ if two ‘polluting jobs’ can be created today and the resultant income used to clean up associated environmental damage later? This short-term drive for growth may indeed be efficient if environmental assets can later be rebuilt, or if environmental hazards did no lasting harm, but this is not always the case. Unlike Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other neighbours, Viet Nam’s environment was already highly degraded before the growth spurt of the 2000s. Without significant change, the likely outcome of continued degradation may resemble China’s – with its huge social costs.
Steve Bass, David Annandale, Phan Van Binh, Tran Phuong Dong,Hoang Anh Nam, Le Thi Kien Oanh, Mike Parsons, Nguyen Van Phuc,and Vu Van Trieu (2010) Integrating environment and development in Viet Nam: Achievements, challenges and next steps
Environment is not central to the economic growth philosophy, except that poverty is seen to be a cause of environmental degradation. Indeed, environmental problems are sometimes attributed explicitly to some ethnic minorities – suggesting that changing the resource use practices of poor people should be the priority. Various policy documents suggest that environmental protection to make up for recent ‘environment sacrifices’ can be ‘afforded’ only once middle-income status is achieved.
The ‘economic growth first’ narrative creates great pressure to ignore environmental considerations at all levels. Production, income and economic growth are the top targets by which officials will be assessed. The associated quantitative indicators are compelling and the lack of similar quantitative environment indicators does nothing to balance the growth incentive. Furthermore, the honourable notion of ‘victory means sacrifice’ would seem to justify acceptance of the idea of sacrificing environment in the medium term – why create only one ‘green job’ if two ‘polluting jobs’ can be created today and the resultant income used to clean up associated environmental damage later? This short-term drive for growth may indeed be efficient if environmental assets can later be rebuilt, or if environmental hazards did no lasting harm, but this is not always the case. Unlike Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other neighbours, Viet Nam’s environment was already highly degraded before the growth spurt of the 2000s. Without significant change, the likely outcome of continued degradation may resemble China’s – with its huge social costs.
Steve Bass, David Annandale, Phan Van Binh, Tran Phuong Dong,Hoang Anh Nam, Le Thi Kien Oanh, Mike Parsons, Nguyen Van Phuc,and Vu Van Trieu (2010) Integrating environment and development in Viet Nam: Achievements, challenges and next steps
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